statement is itself a significant act --a commitment to a particular kind of lasting comportment towards, or relationship with, another person. It is a commitment to a particular type of behavior (caring, nurturing, generous) and attitude (treating the other's concerns as your own) which you will exercise towards another person; if love is anything, it is the name for this pattern of behavior and attitude which we describe as loving. Saying "I love you" is a way of entering into such a relationship, (or offering the possibility of one), constituted by loving activity, and, one hopes, heightened and accompanied by feelings of joy and excitement -but not rooted in them (for, of course, such words as happiness and joy do not name states, either, but rather express a propensity towards, or a willingness to participate in, certain types of behavior. It should be noted, however, that this is not to imply that feelings do not exist -it is only to deny that our psychological words refer to them.)
Hunter follows similar lines of argument with such words as "believe", "know", "think", "pain", and "hope", in each case showing that the words do not function as referents, but rather have a specifically performative aspect --to use them is to do something like commit, warn, inform, and the like. There is even a section on "concealed metaphors" in which he treats such commonly puzzling nouns as "mind" ,"will", and "soul" as useful metaphors for collectively referring to groups of activities (like "mental" or "ethical" activities), by creating the image of a kind of sub-agent -a mind or a soul -as the locus of those activities.
Of course, none of this to say that Hunter's arguments are universally convincing; one cannot help but feel the strain involved in forcing some words into the performative mold. But it is tempting to write off such strain as merely the result of persistent and deeply rooted linguistic dogma, and Hunter has certainly given a highly intelligent, thorough defense of his position, even if an indirect, lexical one.
What remains puzzling about the book is its relation to the work of Wittgenstein. It is not that Wittgenstein's position is not made clear; the book is peppered with quotes which, if they do not actually show that Wittgenstein agreed with Hunter, at least show that he did not clearly disagree. What is curious is, in a book that is clearly not about Wittgenstein, why the fact that he may have agreed with the position presented there is supposed to be important. Clearly, for marketing purposes, saying (or showing) that Wittgenstein agreed with you is the next best thing to having him write sympathetic jacket notes (a possibility complicated by Wittgenstein's not-so-recent death), but philosophically, although the book certainly stands in that sector of philosophical analysis occupied prominently by such thinkers as Wittgenstein and Austin, it nevertheless stands there quite well on its own. Indeed, between sympathetic and critical readings of its arguments and positions, it would be quite possible to treat a wide range of contemporary issues in epistemology and philosophy of language, making this a useful volume for beginning (although serious) courses in those areas of philosophy. As such, the book could serve as an adequate guide to certain limited aspects of Wittgenstein's thought, but that would be, to some degree at least, to misuse a tool designed for more general purposes.
Nevertheless, Hunter's most recent production is an intelligent, stimulating, and, most importantly, accessible introduction to a central contemporary debate --and one which, unlike many introductions, makes a significant contribution of its own. I highly recommend it as a companion to one's own philosophical ruminations on the complexities of language; it will surely make such ruminations more productive.
